

BENDAU & BENDAU PLLC
Clifford P. Bendau, II (AZ Bar No. 030204)
Christopher J. Bendau (AZ Bar No. 032981)
P.O. Box 97066
Phoenix, Arizona 85060
Telephone: (480) 382-5176
Fax: (480) 304-3805
Email: cliffordbendau@bendaulaw.com
chris@bendaulaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jane Doe Employee

Plaintiff,

v.

Wesco Services LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company,

Defendants.

No.

**PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
PROCEED UNDER PSEUDONYM
AND FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
REQUIRING DEFENDANTS TO
REFRAIN FROM DISCLOSING
PLAINTIFF'S IDENTITY**

Plaintiff, Jane Doe Employee ("Plaintiff" or "Jane Doe Employee"), respectfully requests that the Court allow her to proceed under a pseudonym in this matter and for a protective order. Specifically, Plaintiff requests that this Court allow her to proceed under a pseudonym in this matter to protect her identity from public disclosure while she pursues remedies available to her under the FLSA and for a protective order prohibiting Defendants from disclosing her identity.

INTRODUCTION

This case involves the potential for highly sensitive and private information about Jane Doe Employee to become public if her identity is required to be disclosed. Plaintiff

1 is an undocumented immigrant who Defendants employed for nearly two years. On
2 information and belief, Defendants had knowledge of Plaintiff's immigration status
3 throughout her employment but fired her from her job on or about July 1, 2023. On July
4 12, 2023, Defendants directly deposited her final paycheck in the net amount of
5 \$2,089.78 (consisting of both regular-rate and overtime pay). However, on July 13,
6 2023, Defendants reversed the direct deposit and took the entire \$2,089.78. Accordingly,
7 Plaintiff was left with no compensation for work performed in her final semi-monthly
8 pay period. The failure to pay Plaintiff any wages whatsoever for such time
9 (approximately two workweeks) resulted in a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act
10 ("FLSA") and Arizona wage law.

11
12
13 Plaintiff wishes to pursue her legitimate FLSA and Arizona wage claims but fears
14 disclosure of her real name in this lawsuit. She worries that, by disclosing her name and
15 immigration status, she could put herself and/or her family at risk for potential arrest,
16 prosecution, and deportation from this country while pursuing remedies that are
17 otherwise legally available to her, regardless of her immigration status. Plaintiff
18 therefore respectfully requests that the Motion to Proceed Under Pseudonym be granted,
19 that she be permitted to be identified as Jane Doe Employee, and that Defendants be
20 prohibited from disclosing her identity publicly. The following Memorandum of Points
21 and Authorities supports this motion.
22
23
24
25
26
27

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Rule 10(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, “[t]he title of [a] complaint must name all the parties[.]” *See also* LR Civ 7.1(a)(3). But a plaintiff is permitted to file anonymously “in the ‘unusual case’ when nondisclosure of the party’s identity is necessary...to protect a person from harassment, injury, ridicule or personal embarrassment.” *Does I Thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp.*, 214 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting *United States v. Doe*, 655 F.2d 920, 922, n. 1 (9th Cir. 1981)). Ultimately, when the party’s need for anonymity outweighs prejudice to the opposing party and the public’s interest in knowing the party’s identity,” the party may proceed under a pseudonym. *Advanced Textile Corp.*, 214 F.3d at 1068.

Courts in this circuit have employed a five-prong test in evaluating requests to proceed under a pseudonym where fear of retaliation is claimed:

- (i) Severity of the threatened harm;
- (ii) Vulnerability to retaliation;
- (iii) Reasonableness of the fear;
- (iv) Prejudice to Defendants; and
- (v) The public’s interest in court proceedings.

E.E.O.C. v. ABM Industries Inc., 28 F.R.D. 588, 593-95. The analysis below attempts to quantify each factor separately; however, under these circumstances, where Plaintiff is no longer employed by Defendants, the facts and circumstances supporting the analysis blend such that a distinct analysis of each is nearly impossible without discussing a given combination of them at once. Ultimately, the analysis here hinges primarily on the

significance of the harm associated with revealing Plaintiff's identity, the objective reasonableness of that fear, and the irrelevance of immigration status to FLSA actions entirely. Each of the five factors Each factor supports granting the motion.

I. The harm of revealing Jane Doe Employee's identity is substantial.

Defendants' failure to pay Plaintiff any wages whatsoever for the final pay period she worked (approximately two workweeks) resulted in Plaintiff not even having received minimum wage for the time she worked. This violates the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and Arizona wage law and has caused Plaintiff extreme hardship in trying to maintain her livelihood. Plaintiff's status as an undocumented immigrant would, at first glance, appear to directly clash with her ability to obtain payment through use of the Federal Court system, leading to an impossible dichotomy: should she risk starvation or deportation?

Fortunately, the FLSA and supporting case law consistently hold that immigration status is irrelevant to an FLSA claim. *Vallejo v. Azteca Elec. Const. Inc.*, 2015 WL 419634, at *3 (D. Ariz. Feb. 2, 2015), quoting *Jin-Ming Lin v. Chinatown Restaurant Corp.*, 771 F.2d 185, 189 (D. Mass. 2011) ("Adjudication of an FLSA cause of action does not call upon the court to make a discretionary policy- or interest-balancing assessment because court do not have discretion to deny the award of FLSA damages when they have been proved...If a Plaintiff proves a FLSA violation, he is entitled to an FLSA remedy, notwithstanding any interference with immigration policy"). *See also Mariche v. Phoenix Oil, LLC*, 2014 WL 2467964, at *4 (D. Ariz. June 3, 2014) ("Because Mariche's immigration status does not undercut his FLSA claim, evidence

1 regarding his immigration status or its connection with his employment will be
2 inadmissible at trial”).

3 In *Mariche*, the District of Arizona, in holding that immigration status was
4 irrelevant to an FLSA claims, held that “an FLSA plaintiff is not attempting to recover
5 back pay for being unlawfully deprived of a job that he could never have lawfully
6 performed. Rather, he simply seeks to recover unpaid minimum wages and overtime for
7 work already performed.” *Id. See also Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc.*, 364 F.3d 1057, 1065-
8 1066 (9th Cir. 2004) (“We therefore conclude that discovery of each plaintiff’s
9 immigration status constitutes a substantial burden, both on the plaintiffs themselves and
10 on the public interest”).

11 The Ninth Circuit and District of Arizona both consistently hold that inquiry into
12 an FLSA Plaintiff’s immigration status is both an irrelevant and inappropriate because the
13 harm of disclosure would otherwise have a “chilling effect on their pursuit of their
14 workplace rights.” *Id.* at 1061. At a minimum, this is an implicit recognition that the
15 disclosure of immigration is unnecessary to the adjudication of an FLSA claim, and,
16 more importantly, that the harm of disclosing an undocumented FLSA plaintiff’s
17 immigration status is objectively severe. Accordingly, the Court should allow Plaintiff to
18 proceed under the pseudonym “Jane Doe Employee.”

II. If required to reveal her identity without a Protective Order in place, Plaintiff faces an objectively real threat of retaliation.

Plaintiff no longer works for Defendants, so Defendants cannot take classic retaliatory measures in response to the Complaint, such as firing her or reducing her hours. However, Plaintiff is extremely vulnerable to retaliation. Even if Plaintiff is allowed to proceed under a pseudonym, were Defendants to decide to disclose her identity to immigration authorities, the harm contemplated and sought to be mitigated, above, would immediately become a reality.

Without a protective order in place requiring Defendants to maintain the confidentiality of Plaintiff's identity, Defendants would have carte blanche to take retaliatory measures into their own hands. This cannot be allowed to happen if Plaintiff is to be able to pursue her legitimate FLSA claims in federal court. Plaintiff is extremely vulnerable to the threat of retaliation without a protective order in place. Considering the foregoing, Plaintiff is extremely vulnerable to the threat of retaliation without an order in place protecting her identity from disclosure. Accordingly, the Court should allow Plaintiff to proceed under the pseudonym "Jane Doe Employee" and issue an Order requiring Defendants to maintain the confidentiality of her identity.

III. Plaintiff's fear of the potential consequences of revealing her identity is objectively reasonable.

Plaintiff's fear of the potential for her arrest, prosecution, and deportation is objectively reasonable. On the one hand, people like Plaintiff are unskilled, low-wage workers who cannot subsist, let alone support a family, without the compensation they earn. This substantiates Plaintiff's need to pursue her available legal remedies. On the

1 other hand, were Plaintiff required to proceed in federal without her identity being
 2 protected, Plaintiff could expose herself and her family's immigration status and risk
 3 arrest, prosecution, and potential deportation. At least by appearance, without Court
 4 intervention, Plaintiff has no objectively reasonable recourse to redress the wage theft
 5 Defendants have committed against her.
 6

7 As has already been outlined extensively in Section I of this motion, Plaintiff risks
 8 significant consequences for pursuing her otherwise legitimate claims for Defendants'
 9 having failed to pay her wages she earned. As the Ninth Circuit aptly stated in *Rivera*:

10
 11 There are reportedly over 5.3 million workers in the "unauthorized labor"
 12 force...Many of these workers are willing to work for substandard wages in our
 13 economy's most undesirable jobs. While documented workers face the possibility
 14 of retaliatory discharge for an assertion of their labor and civil rights,
 15 undocumented workers confront the harsher reality that, in addition to possible
 16 discharge, their employer will likely report them to the INS and they will be
 17 subjected to deportation proceedings or criminal prosecution. The caselaw
 18 substantiates these fears. *E.g.*, *Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB*, 467 U.S. 883, 886–87, 104
 19 S.Ct. 2803, 81 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (employer reported five undocumented
 20 workers after they voted in favor of union representation); *Does I thru XXIII v.*
 21 *Advanced Textile Corp.*, 214 F.3d 1058, 1062–63 (9th Cir.2000) (court allowed
 22 the plaintiffs to plead their claims anonymously due to their fear of retaliatory
 23 deportation); *Fuentes v. INS*, 765 F.2d 886, 887 (9th Cir.1985) (employer reported
 24 undocumented workers he had employed for three years for less than minimum
 25 wage when they filed suit to recover wages owed), vacated by *Fuentes v. INS*, 844
 26 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.1988); *Singh v. Jutla & C.D. & R's Oil, Inc.*, 214 F.Supp.2d
 27 1056, 1057 (N.D.Cal.2002) (employer recruited an undocumented worker and
 then reported him to the INS after he filed an FLSA claim for unpaid wages);
Contreras v. Corinthian Vigor Ins. Brokerage, Inc., 25 F.Supp.2d 1053, 1055
 (N.D.Cal.1998) (employer reported an undocumented worker *1065 after she filed
 a FLSA claim for unpaid wages).

As a result, most undocumented workers are reluctant to report abusive or
 discriminatory employment practices. *See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce*, 422
 U.S. 873, 879, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975) ("The aliens themselves are
 vulnerable to exploitation because they cannot complain of substandard working
 conditions without risking deportation."); *see also Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrants*

1 *and the Right to Petition*, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 667, 676–79 (2003) (arguing that
2 undocumented workers are reluctant to report a variety of labor and employment
law violations).

3 Granting employers the right to inquire into workers' immigration status in cases
4 like this would allow them to raise implicitly the threat of deportation and criminal
5 prosecution every time a worker, documented or undocumented, reports illegal
6 practices or files a Title VII action. Indeed, were we to direct district courts to
7 grant discovery requests for information related to immigration status in every
case involving national origin discrimination under Title VII, countless acts of
illegal and reprehensible conduct would go unreported.

8 *Rivera*, 364 F.3d at 1065-66.

9 Considering the foregoing, and as determined by countless courts within this
10 jurisdiction, Plaintiff's fears associated with disclosing her identity are objectively
11 reasonable. Accordingly, the Court should allow Plaintiff to proceed under the
12 pseudonym "Jane Doe Employee."

13 **IV. Defendants will not be prejudiced if Plaintiff is allowed to proceed**
14 **pseudonymously.**

15 Defendants would not be prejudiced by Plaintiff's use of a pseudonym, as shown
16 in sections above, since inquiry into immigration status is improper in an FLSA case.
17 *Mariche*, 2014 WL 2467964, at *4. More concerning, however, is that, if Plaintiff were
18 not permitted to proceed under a pseudonym, Defendants would be incentivized to hire
19 undocumented workers and pay them substandard wages (or nothing at all). *Vallejo*,
20 2015 WL 419634, at *2. In *Vallejo*, the District of Arizona recognized that "[r]equiring
21 an employer to pay his unauthorized workers minimum wages prescribed by the FLSA
22 for work already performed does not condone or continue an immigration law violation
23 that has already occurred; it merely ensures that the employer does not take advantage of
24
25
26
27

1 the immigration law violation.” *Id.*, quoting *Lucas v. Jerusalem Café, LLC*, 721 F.3d
2 927, 935 (8th Cir. 2013). The “FLSA’s coverage of unauthorized workers reduces the
3 incentive to hire such workers and discourages illegal immigration.” *Vallejo*, 2015 WL
4 419634, at *2, quoting *Lamonica v. Safe Hurricane Shutters, Inc.*, 711 F.3d 1299, 1308
5 (11th Cir. 2015).

6
7 In *Lucas*, the Eighth Circuit continued:

8 The IRCA and FLSA together promote dignified employment conditions for those
9 working in this country, regardless of immigration status, while firmly
10 discouraging the employment of individuals who lack work authorization...
11 Holding employers liable both for violation of federal immigration law and for
12 violation of federal employment law offsets “what is perhaps the most attractive
feature of unauthorized workers—their willingness to work for less than the
minimum wage.

13 *Lucas*, 721 F.3d at 936 (internal quotations and citations omitted). *See also Singh v. Jutla*
14 *& C.D. & R’s Oil, Inc.*, 214 F.Supp.2d 1056, 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (“Indeed, every
15 remedy extended to undocumented workers under the federal labor laws provides a
16 marginal incentive for those workers to come to the United States. It is just as true,
17 however, that every remedy denied to undocumented workers provides a marginal
18 incentive for employers to hire those workers”).

19
20 In other words, if Plaintiff were not allowed to proceed under a pseudonym, the
21 FLSA’s purpose of ensuring all employees receive at least the minimum wage for work
22 performed would be null and void because Plaintiff would be effectively prohibited from
23 pursuing her otherwise legitimate claims against Defendants. Defendants would thereby
24 be incentivized to hire undocumented workers and engaged in abusive pay practices.
25
26
27

1 Accordingly, Defendants will not be prejudiced by Plaintiff's proceeding under a
2 pseudonym.

3 **V. Not allowing Plaintiff to proceed under pseudonym would burden the public**
4 **interest in resolving wage disputes and ensuring all employees receive the pay**
5 **they earn.**

6 "Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") in 1938 in response to
7 a national concern that the price of American development was the exploitation of an
8 entire class of low-income workers. President Roosevelt, who pushed for fair labor
9 legislations, famously declared: 'The test of our progress is not whether we add more to
10 the abundance of those who have much; it is whether we provide enough for those who
11 have too little.' S. Rep. No. 93-690, at 4 (1974). The FLSA thus safeguards workers
12 from poverty by preventing employers from paying substandard wages in order to
13 compete with one another on the market." *Marsh v. J. Alexander's LLC*, 905 F.3d 610,
14 615 (9th Cir. 2018).

15
16 Here, to prohibit Plaintiff from proceeding under a pseudonym would have a
17 chilling effect on employees coming forward with legitimate FLSA wage claims and
18 would, as discussed above, incentivize employers to hire undocumented workers and
19 engage in abusive pay practices. In *Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc.*, the Ninth Circuit came to the
20 same conclusion when it held that discovery into the plaintiffs' immigration statuses
21 "constitute(d) a substantial burden, both on the plaintiffs themselves and on the public
22 interest." *Rivera*, 364 F.3d at 1066. Likewise, here, Plaintiff would suffer the substantial
23 burden of risking potential arrest, prosecution, and deportation, and Defendants would be
24 rewarded for failing to pay properly under the FLSA, were Plaintiff not allowed to
25
26
27

1 proceed under a pseudonym. Accordingly, the public interest would be burdened if
2 Plaintiff were not allowed to proceed under a pseudonym.

3 **CONCLUSION**

4 Considering the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully requests that she be allowed to
5 proceed under the pseudonym “Jane Doe Employee,” and that the Court enter an order
6 prohibiting Defendants from disclosing her identity.
7

8 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16th day of September, 2023.

9 BENDAU & BENDAU PLLC

10 By: /s/ Clifford P. Bendau, II

11 Clifford P. Bendau, II

12 Christopher J. Bendau

13 *Attorneys for Plaintiff*
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27